International Responsibility: An Introduction by Besson, Samantha
The collection Fondements du droit européen is edited by Professor Samantha Besson 
(University of Fribourg) and Professor Nicolas Levrat (University of Geneva). It publishes col-
lections of essays and monographs (including doctoral dissertations) pertaining to the philo-
sophical, political and historical foundations of European law. 
www.schulthess.com
10 International Responsibility – Essays in Law, History and Philosophy Collection dirigée par SAMANTHA BESSON et NICOLAS LEVRAT
DU
 D
RO
IT
 E
UR
OP
EE
N
International  
Responsibility
Essays in Law, History and Philosophy 
Edited by 
Samantha Besson
With the assistance of 
Matthieu Loup
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 –
 E
ss
ay
s 
in
 L
aw
, H
is
to
ry
 a
nd
 P
hi
lo
so
ph
y
10
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International Responsibility: An Introduction 
SAMANTHA BESSON 
 
Responsibility is a pivotal concept in law.1 Some argue that there can be no law 
without responsibility.2 However central the concept of responsibility is to legality, 
and maybe because it is that inescapable, it remains fraught with conceptual and 
normative difficulties.  
This is even more true of international responsibility.3 A first reason for this is that 
international law is still a relatively new legal order, and the relationship between 
international legality and normativity, on the one hand, and responsibility, on the 
other, has been crucial to its consolidation. A second reason is sovereign equality,4 
and how international responsibility law has provided the means for securing mutual 
accountability between equal States, as a result. A final ground for the specific 
importance of responsibility in international law pertains to legal personality (from 
the Latin persona or mask5) and especially the plurality of international legal 
subjects, and how responsibility, or lack thereof, has been tied to the ability to stand 
for another legal subject (e.g. a State acting and being held responsible for its people 
or an international organization for its member States6), and how responsibility is 
                                                          
1
  See e.g. Tony HONORÉ, “Responsibility and Luck”, in Responsibility and Fault, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1999, p. 14-40; John GARDNER, “The Mark of Responsibility”, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, no. 2, vol. 23, 2003, p. 157-171; John R. LUCAS, Responsibility, Oxford, OUP, 
1995. 
2
  See e.g. Permanent Court of International Justice, 13 September 1928, The Factory at 
Chorzów, Series A, No. 17, p. 47, par. 73: “As regards the first point, the Court observes that it 
is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.” 
3
  See e.g. Andre NOLLKAEMPER, “Responsibility”, in Jean D’ASPREMONT, Sahib SINGH, eds, 
Fundamental Concepts for International Law: Constructing Intelligibility in International 
Legal Studies, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017, forthcoming, available on SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914250> [accessed 2 March 2017]. See also James CRAWFORD, 
State Responsibility – The General Part, Cambridge, CUP, 2013, p. 3-44; Alain PELLET, “The 
Definition of Responsibility in International Law”, in James CRAWFORD, Simon OLLESON, 
Alain PELLET, eds, The Law of International Responsibility, Oxford, OUP, 2010, p. 3-16; 
James CRAWFORD, Simon OLLESON, “The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility”, 
in Malcolm EVANS, ed., International Law, 3
rd
 edn, Oxford, OUP, 2010, p. 441-471. 
4
  See PELLET, “The Definition of Responsibility”, op. cit. n 3, p. 4.  
5
  See Alain SUPIOT, “Introduction”, in Alain SUPIOT, Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, eds, Prendre la 
responsabilité au sérieux, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2015, p. 9-35.  
6
  On secondary liabilities of individuals for their States’ responsibility and of States (and 
individuals) for their international organizations’ responsibility, see Samantha BESSON, 
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increasingly becoming plural and potentially shared by many legal subjects at the 
same time.7 
Of course, responsibility is a highly slippery notion in moral and political 
philosophy in general.8 In short, it refers to the confrontation of a person or group of 
persons with the effects of their action or that of others.  
Herbert L.A. HART captured the polysemic nature of responsibility in (domestic) law 
in this famous passage:  
“As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his 
passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night 
and was responsible for the loss of the ship with all aboard. It was 
rumoured that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was 
responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage, he behaved quite 
irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that he was 
not a responsible person. He always maintained that the exceptional 
winter storms were responsible for the loss of the ship, but in the legal 
proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible 
for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was 
held legally responsible for the loss of life and property. He is still 
alive and he is morally responsible for the deaths of many women and 
children.”9 
Those are just some of the different meanings responsibility may have in domestic 
law. Various domains or regimes of domestic law, such as civil or criminal law, 
have given rise to a few others. In international law, some of those meanings have 
receded to the background, while new ones have come to the fore.  
                                                          
“Individual and State Liability for an International Organization’s Responsibility – The 
Challenge of Fairness Unveiled”, Journal of Legal Philosophy, Special issue on Global justice 
and international law, 2017, forthcoming. 
7
  See e.g. Samantha BESSON, “Shared Responsibilities under the ECHR – Concurrent 
Jurisdictions, Duties and Responsibilities”, in Julia MOTOC, Anne VAN AAKEN, eds, The 
ECHR and General International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2017, in press; Samantha BESSON, “La 
pluralité d’Etats responsables: un état des lieux”, Revue suisse de droit international et de droit 
européen, no. 1, 2007, p. 13-38. 
8
  See David MILLER, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford, OUP, 2007, p. 82; 
Samuel SCHEFFLER, “Individual Responsibility in a Global Age”, in Boundaries and 
Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, New York, OUP, 
2001, p. 32-48.  
9
  Herbert L.A. HART, Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968, p. 211. 
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Based on NOLLKAEMPER’s taxonomy,10 albeit with some revisions, one may 
mention at least four relevant meanings of responsibility in current international law: 
responsibility as a primary duty to act or not; responsibility as a non-allocated 
obligation to act or not (e.g. responsibility to protect);11 responsibility as 
accountability or “answerability” for one’s conduct (whether wrong or not); and 
responsibility as liability, i.e. as a set of secondary obligations that arise from the 
violation of primary duties (wrongdoing). The latter is the most common meaning of 
responsibility used by international lawyers. It is the one that was consolidated in the 
early case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice12 and the International 
Court of Justice,13 and the one at stake in the International Law Commission’s two 
codifications of the law on the international responsibility of States and international 
organizations.14 Importantly, however, the lines between that fourth meaning and the 
others are fluid, as exemplified by the strong ties that subsist between primary duties 
and secondary duties arising from international responsibility law or by the fast-
developing accountability mechanisms in international law. 
Interestingly, responsibility became a central institution in Western and European 
legal orders quite late in history. This is also the case in international law, of course, 
                                                          
10
  See NOLLKAEMPER, “Responsibility”, op. cit. n 3. See also James CRAWFORD, Jeremy 
WATKINS, “International Responsibility”, in Samantha BESSON, John TASIOULAS, eds, The 
Philosophy of International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2010, p. 283-298.  
11
  How do responsibilities differ from duties? Broadly speaking, responsibilities are abstract 
moral requirements whose extent and reasonable distribution among potential bearers are still 
indeterminate and subject to judgment. Nor are responsibilities directed; they have no right-
holder as a result. A difficulty is that duties amount to responsibilities, albeit to concrete and 
perfect ones whose material extent and personal allocation are fully specified and that are 
directed to an individual right-holder. The reverse is not true, however: not all responsibilities 
amount to duties. 
12
  Permanent Court of International Justice, The Factory at Chorzów, supra n 2; Permanent Court 
of International Justice, 17 August 1923, S.S. “Wimbledon”, Series A, No. 1, p. 15. 
13
  ICJ, 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland/Albania), judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4; ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/United States of 
America), judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14; ICJ, 11 April 1949, Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174. 
See also Christian J. TAMS, “Law-making in Complex Processes: the World Court and the 
Modern Law of State Responsibility”, in Christine CHINKIN, Freya BAETENS, eds, Sovereignty, 
Statehood and State Responsibility: Essays in Honour of James Crawford, Cambridge, CUP, 
2015, p. 287-306. 
14
  Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with 
Commentaries, UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 
part 2, 2001, p. 30-143; Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with 
Commentaries, UN Doc. A/66/10, Report of the International Law Commission on its Sixty-
Third Session, p. 50-180. 
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where it only dates back to the 19th Century. But so did it in domestic law, at least in 
the way we understand it today.15  
Of course, early traces of responsibility could be found in Roman law, but what 
responsio (from the Latin re-spondere) amounted to was a guarantee for a debt in 
justice, and what responsalis corresponded to was a guarantee in the law of 
engagement. Responsibility qua liability, and as we know it in contemporary 
(Western, and European in particular) domestic law, is a modern institution that 
grew out of the Natural Law school, and especially emerged from the work of 
seventeenth and eighteenth Century Natural Law scholars like GROTIUS and 
PUFENDORFF and then WOLFF and VATTEL who happened to be both international 
and domestic scholars at the same time. The first systematic accounts date back to 
1850 thanks to HEFFTER, followed by the work of TRIEPEL and ANZILOTTI in 1898 
and 1906, and finally AGO in his 1939 Hague Lectures. What was decisive in this 
development in the late 19th Century resulted from a combination of factors, and in 
particular: the development of international institutions, and especially of 
international dispute settlement mechanisms and of arbitral adjudication; the 
succession of wars, and issuing of reparation awards; and the development of 
foreign investment and of diplomatic protection in this context. 
Today, the law of international responsibility is in ebullition again. Some argue that 
the ILC 2001 and 2011 codifications may just have been one stage in the 
development of international responsibility law. NOLLKAEMPER in particular refers 
to three grounds for change in international responsibility law that match broader 
developments in contemporary international law: “the notion of binding obligations 
often may not matter so much in view of a wide proliferation of other types of norms 
[what one may coin changes in international law normativity]; States and 
international organizations are just two actors in a much more diverse spectrum 
[what one may coin changes in international law subjects]; and responsibility for 
wrongdoing is only one of many accountability mechanisms, let alone the most 
efficient one [what one may coin changes in international law modes of 
accountability].”16  
                                                          
15
  See Jean-Noël ROBERT, “Traduire la responsabilité”, in Alain SUPIOT, Mireille 
DELMAS-MARTY, eds, Prendre la responsabilité au sérieux, Paris, Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2015, p. 101-116; Olivier DESCAMPS, “Histoire du droit de la responsabilité dans le 
monde occidental”, in Alain SUPIOT, Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, eds, Prendre la responsabilité 
au sérieux, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2015, p. 39-53. 
16
  See e.g. NOLLKAEMPER, “Responsibility”, op. cit. n 3. 
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One should add that international responsibility law’s original “fissures”, to quote 
D’ASPREMONT,17 have themselves also contributed to sharpening this crisis and may 
be said to lie at the core of contemporary difficulties. One may mention at least two 
of the consequences of those birth defects for international responsibility law.  
First of all, international responsibility has never been conceived around fault, as 
confirmed by the circumvention of the issue of intent or negligence in the ILC 
codifications. This had made it difficult to develop a regime of causal liability that 
was tellingly referred to as “liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts 
not prohibited by international law”18 where the absence of fault, that is not required 
in mainstream international responsibility law anyway, had to be replaced by the 
absence of a breach. This has been confirmed again in recent debates pertaining to 
due diligence (that is usually conceived as a primary duty instead). Secondly, harm 
and hence a prejudice to repair are largely absent from the structure of international 
responsibility in the ILC codifications. This has had a detrimental impact on the 
conceptualization of causation in international law and, accordingly, of reparations. 
It has also given rise to hurdles in attribution, and explains why the attribution of the 
responsibility of other subjects had to become part of the ordinary operation of 
assigning responsibility rather than a distinct form of responsibility.19  
Besides those two specific structural shortcomings in contemporary international 
responsibility law, one may also consider that its predominant private or civil nature 
needs to be revised to develop a public responsibility regime for States and 
international organizations. This would be in line with the development of the status 
of the individual in international law and, more generally, of the verticalization and 
politicization of international relations. The largely horizontal, State or IO to State or 
IO, regime of responsibility fails to provide sufficient means for State or IO 
responsibility to individuals.20 Of course, such regimes have developed separately, 
especially in international human rights law, but they are usually considered either 
as special regimes or as specifications of a general regime of international 
                                                          
17
  Jean D’ASPREMONT, “The Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations: 
Magnifying the Fissures in the Law of International Responsibility”, International 
Organizations Law Review, no. 1, vol. 9, 2012, p. 15-28. 
18
  See the ILC Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of 
Acts not Prohibited by International Law, UN Doc. A/51/10, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, vol. II, part 2, 1996, p. 100-132. 
19
  See e.g. Samantha BESSON, “La responsabilité solidaire des organisations internationales et des 
Etats – Une institution négligée”, in Alain SUPIOT, ed., La responsabilité solidaire, Paris, 
Publications du Collège de France, 2017, in press. 
20
  See BESSON, “La responsabilité solidaire des organisations internationales et des Etats”, op. cit. 
n 19; BESSON, “Individual and State Liability for an International Organization’s 
Responsibility”, op. cit. n 6. 
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responsibility law.21 There are elements of such a public and objective regime of 
responsibility in the procedural mechanisms available under the ILC Articles, but 
they have not been put to much use so far. Another related concern is the difficulty 
under current international responsibility to hold more than one State or IO 
responsible at the same time. The reasons for this are well-known, but need to be re-
considered in light of the institutionalization of international relations, including of 
international adjudication, on the one hand, and of the growing recognition of the 
importance of individual justice under international law, on the other. The latter 
requires more solidarity in international responsibility.22 
In view of all those difficulties, it is clear why the time has come to re-examine the 
foundations of international responsibility. This is best done not only among 
lawyers, but also with the help of scholars in the two other disciplines represented in 
this volume, i.e. historians and philosophers. International responsibility has indeed 
played a crucial role in those two disciplines’ scholarship or practice, alone or by 
reference to the law. However, it is also because the historical and philosophical 
underpinnings of international responsibility law themselves are currently the most 
vulnerable ones that this call should be taken seriously. Some of those questions, but 
many others too are broached by the authors in this volume. 
*** 
It is useful at the outset of this collection to provide a brief overview of the 
contributions it is comprised of. In each case, a short abstract of the contribution is 
provided.  
Following the structure adopted at the colloquium itself, the present volume is 
organized around five sections that correspond to five clusters of topics: history and 
responsibility, causation and responsibility, primary and secondary responsibilities, 
non-State actors and responsibility, and international organizations and 
responsibility. Needless to say that many other structuring lines could have been 
chosen and that the different chapters in this volume actually contribute to many of 
those issues at the same time and irrespective of the sections they are in. 
The first topic addressed in the book is History and Responsibility. It contains two 
contributions. 
                                                          
21
  See BESSON, “Shared Responsibilities under the ECHR”, op. cit. n 7; Samantha BESSON, 
“L’extra-territorialité des droits de l’homme internationaux: juridictions concurrentes, 
obligations conjointes et responsabilités partagées”, in Pierre D’ARGENT, ed., Droit des 
frontières internationales. Actes des Journées franco-allemandes SFDI-DGIR 2014, Paris, 
Pedone, 2016, p. 245-259. 
22
  See BESSON, “La responsabilité solidaire des organisations internationales et des Etats”, op. cit. 
n 19; BESSON, “La pluralité d’Etats responsables: un état des lieux”, op. cit. n 7. 
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In her chapter The “Historikerstreit” 30 Years Later – From a Responsible Way 
to Remember to a Dogmatic Standardization of Facing the Past, Cécile BLASER 
argues that the Historikerstreit, a heated debate between 1986 and 1988 among 
several prominent West-German intellectuals on the question of the comparability of 
the Nazi past, not only laid ground for a “comparative ease” of commemorating the 
German past, but even led to a standardization of memory in policy-oriented 
peacebuilding. To make this argument, her contribution is organized around two 
sections: a first part about the historians’ quarrel itself, its main arguments and 
achievements, and a second part which explains how the Historikerstreit 
contributed, as an important part of the process that gave rise to the “facing the past” 
framework, to developing a trend to standardize memorialization. The author argues 
that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for how to face atrocious pasts. In 
order to find a responsible way to deal with past atrocities, each post-conflict society 
must examine and deal with its own crimes in their uniqueness. Without wanting to 
propose a standardized solution for a critique of standardization, the author pleads 
for new historians’ debates in post-conflict societies – in whatever form they may 
appear – to find a tailor-made solution for how to deal with the past and how to take 
responsibility for it. 
In his contribution Nineteenth-Century Interventions d’Humanité and the 
Question of Responsibility: A Very Short Historical Overview, Prof. Davide 
RODOGNO touches upon the case of humanitarian interventions, or interventions 
d’humanité that took place throughout the nineteenth century. The author examines 
the issue of responsibility from the point of view of the intervening States in an 
analysis which is partial, non-exhaustive and leaves unaddressed the issue of the 
ways in which the beneficiaries of these interventions interpreted such responsibility 
as well as the ways in which the target State of the intervention attempted to reject 
the allegedly responsible intervention of foreign States within its national and 
imperial frontiers. This short overview takes the perspective of the European powers 
and the articulation of a specific idea of responsibility that revolved around legal, 
moral and political motivation. The author argues that a contextualized analysis 
might eventually enhance a dialogue with scholars interested in the history and 
historiography of human rights and their most flagrant violations as well as with 
scholars working on the controversial principle of the responsibility to protect. 
The second topic addressed in the book is Causation and Responsibility. It contains 
two contributions. 
In his chapter Responsibility without Causation? The Public International Law 
Experiment, Dávid M. PUSZTAI argues that the decision of the International Law 
Commission to exclude causation from the constitutive pillars of international 
responsibility did not hold ground in practice. The author submits that there are 
several possible doctrinal explanations for this, ranging from arguments about a 
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fragmented law of international responsibility to an allegedly emerging new test of 
complicity-based attribution. He then draws on the works of legal philosophers 
engaged with action theory to argue that the law of international responsibility lacks 
a developed theory of action. Most of the conceptual problems surrounding 
causation and its relationship with attribution stem from a missing theoretical 
foundation for the concept of the “internationally wrongful act” itself. The author 
proposes a “causal theory of action” to address this deficiency. 
In her chapter Responsibility for International Monetary Stability in the Post-
Crisis Era, Lucia SATRAGNO considers that the stability of the international 
monetary system depends both on domestic and international policies. There are 
clear mandates that attribute responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of 
monetary stability at the domestic and regional level to the central banks (as States 
agencies) and for the promotion of monetary stability at the international level to the 
International Monetary Fund (the central international monetary institution). These 
overlapping dominions dealing with monetary stability are not static and interact and 
also influence each other. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 highlighted this 
interaction by evidencing the existing trade-off among domestic policies and global 
monetary stability. Consequently, this contribution aims to explore the role of law 
and institutions in safeguarding international monetary stability with a special focus 
on the allocation of duties and responsibilities at the different levels of governance. 
In doing so the author argues that the emerging principle of Common Concern of 
Humankind can be a valuable and original methodological approach to analyse the 
existing trade-off in the field of international monetary law.  
The third topic addressed in the book is Primary and Secondary Responsibilities. It 
contains three contributions. 
In his chapter State Responsibility Aspects of a Common Concern Based 
Approach to Collective Action, Zaker AHMAD argues that we know currently of no 
international legal norms that could be used to resolve problems of supply of global 
public goods (i.e. collective action problems). In this context, he examines the call 
for greater acceptance of the principle of Common Concern of Humankind to 
resolve collective action problems. The author demonstrates the concept’s growing 
legal influence over time by looking at its evolution, meaning and normative 
implications. Yet, he argues, common concern cannot be categorized as a general 
principle or a customary norm of international law. It entails the primary duty of all 
States to engage in effective global cooperation and to take measures domestically. 
Common concern would also suggest that the secondary obligations of States would 
extend beyond the limits suggested by the articles on State responsibility, calling for 
a responsibility to take non-forcible measures against the non-performers of primary 
duties. 
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In his chapter Theorizing the Retrospectiveness of International Responsibility: 
A Historical Inquiry into Restitutio in Integrum, Edoardo STOPPIONI aims at 
reconceptualising the remedy of restitutio in integrum using legal history and theory. 
He invites us on a journey through the historical origins and the evolution of the 
narratives on restitution in international law and deconstructs the major problems 
raised by this legal instrument: its polysemic use, its relationship with the primary 
obligation and cessation. He argues that restitutio in integrum is an attribution of the 
international jurisdictional function that aims at eradicating the internationally 
wrongful act. Its role of re-establishing the status quo ante reflects the need to repair 
the legal injury that the violation causes in the international order. Therefore, 
restitution is strictly linked to the primary obligation and shares the very 
philosophical underpinning of international responsibility, which is in primis the 
protection of international legality. 
In his chapter The Content of State Responsibility under the European 
Convention on Human Rights – Some Reflections on the Court’s Approach to 
General International Law on State Responsibility, Matthieu LOUP compares the 
content of State responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
under the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. Pointing at their differences and similarities, he aims at assessing the ways in 
which the European Court of Human Rights developed its understanding of the 
content of State responsibility in relation with general international responsibility 
law. The author argues that the Court limited itself in most instances to specifying 
the content of the general provisions of the Articles. Real derogations are limited to 
very specific elements, such as the invocation of domestic law to bar full reparation 
at the domestic level. This assessment provides useful perspectives for the Court at a 
time when its authority is challenged, offering a basis in international responsibility 
law on which to ground progressive developments of the Court’s approach to 
reparation and prevention of future breaches of the Convention.  
The fourth topic addressed in the book is Non-State Actors and Responsibility. It 
contains two contributions. 
In her chapter The Importance and Difficulties of Establishing and Clarifying 
the International Legal Personality and Responsibility of Non-State Armed 
Groups, Heleen M. HIEMSTRA argues that, because the great majority of 
contemporary armed conflicts are of a non-international nature, the role and impact 
of non-State armed groups have greatly increased in significance. Yet, the legal 
position and direct international responsibility of such groups are far from 
crystallized and States remain reluctant to clarify this under international law. If 
assumed that non-State armed groups, as parties to non-international armed 
conflicts, are bound by international humanitarian law applicable in such conflicts, 
the implications of possible violation of such rules remain unclear. The author’s 
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contribution outlines why the current approaches to deal with the responsibility of 
non-State armed groups are unsatisfactory. Both the responsibility of States for 
certain conduct of non-State armed groups, as well as individual criminal 
responsibility of the groups’ members do not sufficiently address the responsibility 
gap that exists for non-State armed groups. While highlighting some of the 
challenges involved therein, the author advocates a move towards the direct 
responsibility of non-State armed groups themselves at the international level.  
In his chapter Targeted Killings and the Punishment of Enemy Leaders, 
Francesco ROMANI, considers that the elimination of enemy leaders through 
operations of targeted killing has become a strategic priority of belligerents. 
Struggling to place this evanescent feature of contemporary warfare within the 
traditional framework of the laws of armed conflict, international legal scholarship 
has however overlooked some of its most important innovations and distinguishing 
features. In his contribution, the author aims at filling this conceptual lacuna by 
highlighting how the notion of individual criminal responsibility is progressively 
transforming and replacing the traditional grounds for targeting enemy leaders. The 
first part of the chapter demonstrates how the Israeli practice has relied on 
considerations based on the individual responsibility of enemy leaders to 
significantly expand the concept of direct participation in hostilities. In the second 
part, centred on recent US practice, the author shows how similar considerations 
have transformed the continuity and imminence of a threat from a justification of the 
use of force vis-à-vis States into a basis for targeting individuals. Building on these 
considerations, he then assesses the meaning of individual responsibility in the 
context of targeted killings, and investigates the tensions and dangers created by the 
use of criminal law concepts as a ground for targeting. Finally, he turns to 
interpreting the importance of individual criminal responsibility in the field of 
targeted killing as an inescapable, albeit upsetting, consequence of the processes that 
have placed the individual at the centre of international law. 
The fifth topic addressed in the book is International Organizations and 
Responsibility. It contains two contributions. 
In her chapter Immunities and Responsibilities of International Organizations: 
Two Sides of the Same Coin or Two Separate Coins?, Aurélie GALETTO argues 
that when courts and authors separate immunities and responsibility (and introduce 
that the latter has no effect on the former), they only mean that immunities, as 
procedural bars, have no effect on the legality of the behaviour of the wrongdoer. 
Her contribution aims at specifying this reasoning and defending the position that 
immunities should be understood as an inability of a given court or tribunal to 
examine certain causes, but not generally as an inability of the wrongdoer to answer 
for its actions, taking into account that the answer can take many forms. Immunity 
could amount to a procedural obstacle to judicial liability, but should not have for 
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consequence the unaccountability of the subject as soon as a breach of an 
international obligation exists. By examining the case law, the author demonstrates 
that, in some cases, especially when no judicial forum exists and when the immunity 
is absolute, immunities have the de facto effect of leaving the three types of 
normative consequences of responsibility up to the wrongdoer (and, in particular, an 
international organization), letting it choose to respond or not without having to 
clearly justify its choices and answers for its actions. The author concludes that it 
should be established that immunities should not work as a veil that “isolates” a 
subject of law from the consequences of its actions. 
In her chapter Challenging the Presumption of “Non-Responsibility” of Member 
States of International Organizations, Odette MURRAY traces the genealogy of the 
position espoused in the 2011 Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations that member States of an international organization are not 
responsible for the wrongful acts, or the liabilities, of the organization. An analysis 
of the preparatory work of the two leading codification efforts on member State 
responsibility – the 1995 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International and the 
International Law Commission’s own 2011 Articles – exposes some deep divisions 
among the members of those respective institutions, with “non-responsibility” 
provisions being adopted over the objection of a minority of members. The author 
argues that case law on the topic is more equivocal than usually presented. 
Ultimately, the author considers that a preference for the non-responsibility of 
member States is based on policy. She challenges the balance which the 
Commission’s work has struck between the competing policy considerations, 
arguing that it has put too much store in the autonomy and independent functioning 
of the organization, to the detriment of the protection of innocent third parties and 
the fundamental obligation of reparation for injuries. 

